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Abstract
This paper provides a two-stage decision framework in which two or more parties
exercise a jointly held real option. We show that a single party’s timing decision is
always socially efficient if it precedes bargaining on the terms of sharing. However,
if the sharing rule is agreed before the exercise timing decision is made, then
socially optimal timing is attained only if there is a cash payment element in the
division of surplus. If the party that chooses the exercise timing can divert value
from the project, then the first-best outcome may not be possible at all and the
second-best outcome may be implemented using a contract that is generally not
optimal in the former cases. Our framework contributes to the understanding of
a range of empirical regularities in corporate and entrepreneurial finance.
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1 Introduction
Many real option problems involve two or more parties which can generate a surplus
by jointly exercising an option. In such cases, the option can only be exercised if the
parties agree on the timing of the exercise and on the rule how to divide the proceeds.
For example, when several firms enter into a joint venture to develop an oil field, they
have to agree not only on how they will share revenues when extraction starts, but also
on when to invest in order to start the extraction. Similarly, when biotechnology firms
engage in joint R&D projects, they need to agree on the timing of capital injections
as well as their economic stakes in the projects. Finally, in the context of mergers &
acquisitions, an acquirer and target both care about the timing as well as the terms of
a merger between the two firms.
Some of the real-world scenarios have already attracted attention and are sepa-
rately examined in the literature. Cvitanić, Radas, and Šikić (2011) study optimal
time of entry in the case of a cooperation, such as a joint venture, on a new product
development between a large company and an entrepreneurial firm. Lambrecht (2004)
analyzes a merger between two firms.1 In this case, the payoff from the option exercise
is the difference between the combined firm value and the sum of the values of individ-
ual firms with no option to merge. The strike price of the option is equivalent to the
sum of fixed (irreversible) costs that each of the firms has to incur when merging. Also,
an expansion of the firm financed by debt (cf. Mauer and Sarkar (2005), Sundaresan
and Wang (2007) and Hackbarth and Mauer (2012)) can be interpreted as a joint real
option exercise. In this case, two parties have to agree on terms of debt repayment,
which directly influences investment timing.
Despite the multitude of situations in which a real option can effectively be jointly
held by two (or even more) parties, a comprehensive analysis of joint exercise strate-
gies has not been undertaken so far. In this paper, we develop a simple yet general
framework that embeds typical contractual arrangements analyzed in the extant liter-
ature as its special cases and derive their efficiency implications for decision making.
We subsequently use the proposed framework to rationalize various types of contracts
observed in economic practice.2
We start off by analyzing the optimal exercise policy of a real option that is jointly
held by two parties (firms).3 In particular, we employ a two-stage decision-making
1Related contributions to the literature on mergers and acquisitions include Morellec and Zhdanov
(2005), Alvarez and Stenbacka (2006), and Lukas, Reuer, and Welling (2012).
2We abstain from analyzing a related but distinct situation in which parties compete against one
other to be first to exercise a non-exclusive real option. Chevalier-Roignant, Flath, Huchzermeier,
and Trigeorgis (2011) provide a recent comprehensive survey of this stream of literature.
3Where appropriate, we use terms “firms” and “parties” interchangeably.
2
framework in which the parties determine the sharing rule as an outcome of Nash
bargaining and one of them makes the exercise decision.4 In terms of the sharing rule,
we consider cash transfers as well as ownership stakes in the project.5 To capture two
different types of contractual arrangements present in the literature, we contrast the
scenario in which the exercise decision is made first with the one in which it is the
division of proceeds that precedes the exercise decision. We subsequently extend the
framework to allow for the real option to be held jointly by any number of parties
and demonstrate that the results derived for two firms continue to hold. Finally, to
investigate the robustness of earlier results, we analyze a situation in which the party
that chooses the investment timing is able to divert a fraction of the project value at
a deadweight cost.
We find that when the exercise decision is made first, timing is always socially
(and individually) optimal. It is irrelevant which firm makes the investment decision
and how bargaining power is distributed among the firms. Furthermore, the result
holds even if cash transfers are not allowed for as well as in the case in which the firm
that makes the exercise decision simply buys out the stake of the other firm. One
special case of this result, with the ratio of the firms’ bargaining power coefficients
being equal to the ratio of their respective exercise costs, corresponds to the friendly
merger discussed in Lambrecht (2004) as well as to Morellec and Zhdanov (2005). If we
interpret the model such that one party represents an entrepreneur and the other an
investor, the result implies that the entrepreneur always invests optimally regardless
of the way he finances the project.
In the opposite case, when the sharing rule is determined first (as, among others,
in the hostile takeover scenario of Lambrecht (2004) as well as in Mauer and Sarkar
(2005), where a loan commitment is made), investment timing is socially inefficient
unless a combination of a stake in the project and a cash transfer is used. In this
case, it generally matters which firm makes the exercise decision and what amount of
bargaining power it wields. A key implication is that the party exercising the option,
e.g., the entrepreneur, is no longer indifferent between the financing choices and may
generally invest inefficiently early or late.
We also find that the firm that makes the exercise decision almost always prefers
4We subsequently analyze implications of an assumption that both parties have to agree on the
exercise trigger. Moreover, the fact that firms may already receive cash flows from existing assets is
irrelevant in Nash bargaining as it is the difference between new and existing cash flows that matters.
Therefore the latter can be easily normalized to zero so the solution is interpreted in terms of sharing
the surplus.
5Similar contractual forms are examined in de Bettignies (2008). While this paper focuses on
optimal exercise of jointly held real options, de Bettignies focuses on the issue of effort complementarity
in a discrete-time setting with no discretion over the investment timing.
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to determine the sharing rule first such that it obtains full rights to the project by
making a cash transfer to the other firm upon investment, which it inefficiently delays.
If that firm is an entrepreneur, this suggests that he almost always prefers (riskless)
debt financing where terms are fixed before the investment (debt commitment).6 We
show that equity financing can be rationalized when we extend our framework to allow
for the possibility that the entrepreneur can divert part of the project’s value at the
time of investment.
The present paper studies optimal exercise of jointly held real options in a two-stage
decision-making framework. Other contributions featuring such a framework include
Shibata and Nishihara (2011) and Lukas, Reuer, and Welling (2012), next to earlier
discussed Cvitanić et al (2011), Lambrecht (2004), and Mauer and Sarkar (2005).
Shibata and Nishihara (2011) study a setting in which the level of managerial effort is
determined first and the exercised decision is made second. In Lukas at al (2012), who
study contingent earnouts in mergers and acquisitions, the timing of the takeover is set
first, and the target firm only then chooses its level of post-takeover cooperation. Our
paper is different from these contributions in that it interacts the sharing rule decision
with the decision to exercise the option to invest and the interaction takes place in a
broad framework that can be applied to different settings. It also adds to the literature
by demonstrating the efficiency implications of the sequence in which the decisions take
place, the type of financial contract used, and the value diversion threat.
Bargaining over terms of investment in our framework is comparable to the way
buyers and sellers negotiate over terms of trade in a supply chain (Nagarajan and
Sošić (2008)). The scenario in which bargaining precedes timing decision is similar to
a situation when the wholesale price is fixed first and procurement takes place at a
later date (Caldentey and Haugh (2009)). Furthermore, contracts considered in this
paper show similarities with those used in studies of coordination in decentralized
supply chains. For example, a contract that allows one firm to retain full stake in the
project by compensating the other firm with a cash transfer is akin to a wholesale
price contract, and the one that combines a stake in the project with a cash transfer is
like a revenue sharing contract in which a supplier obtains a share of retail profits by
charging a retailer a lower wholesale price. Then, our finding that a combination of a
stake in the project and a cash transfer leads to investment efficiency is consistent with
the result that revenue sharing contracts can coordinate supply chains (Cachon and
Lariviere (2005), Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004)). The value diversion threat
6As we explain below (riskless) debt financing is equivalent to the entrepreneur making a cash
compensation to the investor in return for his input in the project (which may include both monetary
as well as a non-monetary component).
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in our framework can be likened to the selling effort of the retailer (Taylor (2002)
and Gurnani, Erkoc, and Luo (2007)). Finally, two recent papers study optimal time
to invest by establishing a supply chain.7 Chen (2012) analyzes a case in which a
supplier and a retailer cooperatively determine the optimal entry time when there is
demand uncertainty. Lukas and Welling (2014) model the optimal timing of “climate-
friendly” investments in a supply chain. In comparison to these recent contributions,
this paper allows a larger contracting set, a value diversion threat and the variation
in the sequence of events. Its framework is useful in analyzing contracting problems
in the context of mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, venture capital investments,
loan commitments as well as supply chains.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We describe our basic set-up
in section 2. The exercise policy is presented in section 3 and the possibility of value
diversion is introduced in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic set-up
We begin the analysis with a simple case where two parties, i and j, jointly hold a
real option to invest in a project. The project requires from each of the parties an
irreversible investment outlay of Ii and Ij, respectively (investment outlay may include
both monetary as well as a non-monetary contribution). The project value, which is
Vt at time t, follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dVt = αVtdt+ σVtdzt (1)
where α is the constant drift parameter, σ is the constant variance parameter, and
dzt is the increment of a Wiener process.8 The constant riskless rate is r and parties
are risk neutral.9 The value of the project, Vt, is observable by both parties but not
verifiable by a court. This implies that it is impossible to write an enforceable contract
that would compel one party to exercise the option at a particular level of Vt.
Without a loss of generality, the control right over the exercise decision is allocated
to firm i. However, firm i has to agree with firm j over the sharing rule of the project’s
7Other type of real options (or flexibilities) in supply chains include reordering and return options
(Wu and Kleindorfer (2005), Burnetas and Ritchken (2005)), option to switch supplier (Kamrad
and Siddique (2004)), and flexibility to relax the retailer’s budget constraint (Caldentey and Haugh
(2009)).
8Throughout the rest of the paper we drop the subscript t, and denote Vt as V for the sake of
simplicity.
9Alternatively, one could assume that the payout from the project is spanned by a portfolio of
traded assets.
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value. In other words, while the timing of investment is determined by one party, the
terms of investment is determined by both parties.
The sharing rule specifies the fraction of the project value received by each firm.
firm i receives fraction γi ≥ 0 of the project (so γi + γj = 1). We also allow for fixed
payments between firms, such that the amount firm i pays to firm j is Ci (so Ci = −Cj).
Quantities γi and Ci are endogenously determined as outcomes of Nash bargaining. The
bargaining power parameter of firm i is given by ηi ≥ 0 (with ηi+ηj = 1).10 In general,
when the investment occurs, firm i receives the net payoff equal to γiV − Ci − Ii.
One scenario that corresponds to this setting is when firm i is a wealth-constrained
entrepreneurial firm and firm j is an investor (cf. Jørgensen, Kort, and Dockner (2006)).
The entrepreneurial firm owns the project, but needs outside financing from the in-
vestor, who may, for example, be a venture capitalist. If the only role of the investor
was to provide financing, perfectly competitive capital markets would imply that ηi = 1
in such a case.11 Another relevant scenario is when firms i and j are two firms (poten-
tially in the same industry) that have a real option to start a joint venture. We refer
to these two scenarios as the ‘entrepreneurial finance (EF) scenario’ and ‘joint venture
(JV) scenario’ respectively.
2.1 The project’s capital and ownership structure
The outcome of bargaining can lead to various types of capital structure. γi can be
thought of as firm i’s equity claim on the project. Ci can be either a cash transfer from
firm i to j, or the value of riskless debt issued by firm i and held by firm j. In the
latter case, Ci = bir , where bi is the perpetual coupon flow that firm i pays to firm j
in exchange for firm j’s initial contribution to the project, Ij. Consequently, once the
investment takes place, the project’s capital structure can take a few different forms.
Table 1 summarizes the project’s capital and ownership structures under the scenar-
ios EF and JV and for different levels of γi and Ci. The first possible capital structure
involves no cash transfers Ci = 0 (which essentially implies that 0 < γi < 1). In the EF
scenario, this corresponds to a case in which the entrepreneur uses pure equity financ-
ing. In the JV scenario, it implies that firms share the project’s ownership without
any side payments. The second possible capital structure features full ownership by
10We assume that the bargaining power distribution is exogenous and cannot be influenced by, e.g.,
the choice of capital structure (as in Perotti and Spier (1993) and Lambrecht and Pawlina (2013), see
also the discussion in Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008)).
11When there is perfect competition for financing projects, investors are ready to invest in projects
that are expected to yield them zero net payoffs. This is equivalent to the entrepreneurial firm having
the full bargaining power (i.e., ηi = 1), since the entrepreneur appropriates the entire net present
value of the project, while the investor merely expects to break even.
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one of the two firms, such that either γi = 1 (which implies Ci > 0) or γi = 0 (which
implies Ci < 0). In the context of the EF scenario, the entrepreneur is using pure debt
financing when γi = 1 or cashing out by selling the project to the investor when γi = 0.
In terms of the JV scenario, firm i is obtaining the project’s full ownership when γi = 1,
or ceding it when γi = 0.12 Finally, a third possibility involves cash transfers alongside
a share of ownership, such that 0 < γi < 1 and Ci 6= 0. For the EF scenario, this
implies that the entrepreneur uses a mixture of equity and debt financing. For the JV
scenario, it implies that firms engage in side payments along with sharing the project’s
ownership.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
2.2 The sequence of moves
In our analysis, we allow not only for the the possibility of sharing the surplus and
cash transfers, but also allow for two different sequences of moves, as they have been
demonstrated to affect the option exercise policy (see, e.g., Lambrecht (2004)). In
particular, we consider two situations: (1) firm i choosing the timing of the exercise
and subsequently firms i and j choosing the terms (using the Nash bargaining solution),
or (2) firms i and j committing to the terms and only then firm i choosing the timing.
These two different sequences of moves are encountered in various different settings
in the literature. Lambrecht (2004) studies them in the context of mergers and acquisi-
tions. The former sequence in his model corresponds to a friendly merger in which the
timing of the merger is agreed first and then the terms of the merger are determined.
The latter sequence corresponds to a hostile takeover such that the target commits
to the terms and the acquirer only then chooses the timing of takeover. Similarly,
Cvitanić et al. (2011) study them in the context of joint ventures allowing one firm
to choose the timing of venture while the other sets the terms. The latter sequence
is studied by Mauer and Sarkar (2005) in the context of debt financing in a perfectly
competitive capital market. In Mauer and Sarkar (2005), equityholders of a firm first
agree with debtholders the terms of a loan commitment, and then once these terms
are fixed, equityholders decide when to invest. This is in contrast to, for instance,
Sundaresan and Wang (2007), where terms of debt financing are effectively set once
the choice of investment timing is known.
12In our subsequent analysis, we do not consider the case when γi = 0, since its outcome is trivial.
It is optimal for firm i to invest at V0 (i.e., immediately at t = 0) when it cedes its right to the project
in return for a cash transfer from firm j.
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We demonstrate that the sequence of moves has a profound effect on the timing of
the option exercise, which, in turn, has significant value implications. The reason why
the sequence of moves matters is as follows. If firm i first chooses the threshold, and
then bargains with firm j (“exercise decision first, sharing rule second”), the investment
timing decision is ex ante and is shown to maximize the total value of the investment
option. If firm i first bargains with firm j, and then chooses the threshold (“sharing
rule first, exercise decision second”), the investment timing decision is ex post and it is
only the value of firm i’s claim that is maximized. In the former case, firm i chooses
the investment timing in anticipation of the outcome of the bargaining game. In the
latter case, firms play the bargaining game in anticipation of firm i’s subsequent choice
of investment threshold.13
3 Exercise policy
3.1 The efficient outcome
In order to evaluate whether the actions of firms lead to an efficient outcome, we
determine the first-best investment threshold. The first-best threshold maximizes the
expected net present value (NPV) of the project, defined as the NPV of the project
at the time of investment multiplied by the discount factor reflecting the present value
of $1 received upon hitting the investment threshold (see (4) below). This threshold
solves the following problem (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), ch. 5):
max
V
(V − I)
(
V0
V
)β
(2)
and is equal to:
V = kI (3)
where I = Ii + Ij, k = ββ−1 and β =
1
σ2
(−(α − σ2/2) +√(α− σ2/2)2 + 2rσ2). The
project’s expected NPV is maximized if firm i exercises the real option when the project
value reaches V . The maximum expected NPV is equal to:
NPV = (V − I)
(
V0
V
)β
= (k − 1)I
(
V0
kI
)β
(4)
13When ηi = 0, both situations can be thought of as different types of Stackelberg games. In
particular, when the exercise decision is made first (sharing rule is determined first), firm i chooses
the investment threshold as a leader (follower), and firm j determines the sharing rule as a follower
(leader). When ηi = 1, firm i dictates both the timing and the terms of investment, and firm j simply
breaks even.
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If firm i chooses a lower (higher) threshold, the expected NPV is reduced due to invest-
ing inefficiently early (late). We assume that V0 is sufficiently low so that immediate
investment is not optimal.
3.2 Exercise decision first, sharing rule second
The firms can agree to exercise the option by choosing the timing of the option exercise
first and only subsequently agree on how to split the surplus. Initially, firm i decides
when to invest, so that it chooses the investment threshold that maximizes the value
of its option to invest. When the project value reaches that threshold, firm i bargains
with firm j over the terms of financing. If they agree, they invest in the project and
split the proceeds as agreed. Alternatively, firm i can make a payment of Ci to firm
j as a compensation for incurring cost Ij and acquire the entire project V . In the
former case, the firms bargain over the equity stake γi, whereas in the latter case, the
magnitude of payment Ci has to be agreed upon. In either case, the result of bargaining
depends on the investment threshold chosen by firm i in advance. Obviously, firm i
anticipates the sharing rule that will be agreed at any threshold (i.e. γi(V ), Ci(V ) or
a combination thereof), and chooses V accordingly. For two firms i and j, we have
γj = 1− γi, Cj = −Ci, ηj = 1− ηi and Ij = I − Ii. Thus, the bargaining problem is:
max
γi,Ci
[γiV − Ci − Ii]ηi [(1− γi)V + Ci − (I − Ii)]1−ηi (5)
Firm i makes the exercise decision given the anticipated outcome of bargaining γi(V )
and Ci(V ):
max
V
[γi(V )V − Ci(V )− Ii]
(
V0
V
)β
(6)
Proposition 1 (Exercise decision first, sharing rule second)
(i) Ce,i = 0: If the exercise timing decision is made first and the sharing rule is
determined second, the fraction of the project’s value received by firm i is:
γe,i =
Ii + ηi(k − 1)I
kI
(7)
(ii) γe,i = 1: If firm j is compensated by firm i in return for fully ceding its rights to
the project, it receives payment Ci equal to:
Ce,i = Ij + ηj(k − 1)I (8)
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(iii) 0 < γe,i < 1 and Ce,i 6= 0: Finally, the firms can agree to split the project between
them and provide an additional compensation in cash. In such a case, the fraction
of the project retained by firm i and its cash compensation satisfy the following
equation:
γe,ikI + Ce,i − Ii = ηi(k − 1)I (9)
In all three cases, the investment threshold is:
V e = V (10)
Proof. See Appendix A
Equations (7) and (8) indicate that the stake in the project γe,i increases and the
amount of cash compensation Ce,i decreases with firm i’s bargaining power coefficient
ηi and its contribution to the project Ii. Since ∂γe,i/∂k ≷ 0 for ηi ≷ Ii/I, the received
fraction of the project increases with project volatility (as well as its growth rate and
decreases with the interest rate) if firm i’s bargaining power is sufficiently high and
decreases otherwise.14 Moreover, ∂Ce,i/∂k > 0 (cf. (8)), so the amount of cash com-
pensation increases with project volatility irrespective from the value of the bargaining
power coefficient.
When the exercise decision is made first, and the sharing rule is determined second,
the investment timing is always optimal (i.e. V e = V ), regardless of the distribution
of bargaining power and of the choice between equity and cash compensation. The
intuition is as follows. When firm i is making the exercise decision, it anticipates that
it will get a fixed slice of the surplus regardless of when the investment takes place.
Therefore, it is optimal for firm i that the investment takes place when the surplus is
maximized, since this also maximizes the value of firm i’s slice of the surplus. In fact,
if it were firm j making the exercise decision, it would choose the same investment
threshold, since, like firm i, firm j anticipates that it will receive a fixed fraction of
the surplus and therefore it would also have an incentive to maximize the surplus.
As a result, in the analyzed scenario it is irrelevant which firm chooses the timing
(or, whether they do it jointly) as each firm has an incentive to choose the first-best
investment threshold.15
Proposition 1 has specific implications for the EF and JV scenarios. In terms of
the EF scenario, the entrepreneur is indifferent between financing the project with
equity, debt, or a mixture of both. In other words, the entrepreneur’s investment
14Note that ∂k/∂σ > 0, ∂k/∂r < 0 and ∂k/∂α > 0, cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), ch. 5.
15The (friendly merger) outcome in Lambrecht (2004) (see also Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)) is a
special case of the situation described in Proposition 1 with γi = ηi = Ii/I.
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timing decision can be separated from his financing decision, and the capital structure
is irrelevant. In terms of the JV scenario, the allocation of control right over the
exercise decision is irrelevant. Each firm chooses the same investment threshold when
it has the control right. In other words, firms i and j agree on when to exercise their
joint real option to form a joint venture.
3.3 Sharing rule first, exercise decision second
One could easily envisage a situation where firms first commit to the terms of a deal
and only subsequently choose its timing (cf. Mauer and Sarkar (2005)). In such a
case, at t = 0 firms bargain with each other either about the equity stake γi or the
cash payment Ci, or both. If the parties agree, they commit to provide Ii and Ij
at the time of investment. The key point is that, after the terms of investment is
set, firm i’s option to delay investment is still alive. In general, and unlike in the
previous subsection, it matters which firm chooses the timing of investment once the
terms are agreed upon. Obviously, the investment threshold depends on the financial
terms that the firms have been agreed upon. If the parties are negotiating the sharing
rule without cash transfers, once γi is fixed, firm i will maximize the expected NPV
based on its share of the project value γiV . Similarly, if they are negotiating the cash
compensation associated with firm j ceding its right to the project, once Ci is fixed,
firm i will maximize the expected NPV based on its residual claim V −Ci. Therefore,
the parties bargain over financial terms, taking into account firm i’s ex-post choice of
investment threshold (i.e. V (γi), V (Ci), or V (γi, Ci)). Firm i’s exercise decision is:
max
V
(γiV − Ci − Ii)
(
V0
V
)β
(11)
The parties bargain anticipating that firm i will invest when the project value reaches
V (γi, Ci):
max
γi,Ci
[γiV (γi, Ci)− Ci − Ii]ηi
[(1− γi)V (γi, Ci) + Ci − (I − Ii)]ηi−1
(
V0
V (γi, Ci)
)β
(12)
Proposition 2 (Sharing rule first, exercise decision second)
(i) Cs,i = 0: If the sharing rule is determined first and the timing decision is deter-
mined by firm i second, the fraction of the project’s value received by firm i and
11
the investment threshold are:
γs,i =
Ii[1 + ηi(k − 1)]
I + (k − 1)Ii (13)
V
(γ)
s =
1 + (Ii/I)(k − 1)
1 + ηi(k − 1) V (14)
(ii) γs,i = 1: If firm j is compensated by firm i in return for fully ceding its rights to
the project, cash transfer Ci and the investment threshold equal
Cs,i = Ij + ηj(k − 1)I (15)
V
(C)
s = (1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))V (16)
(iii) 0 < γs,i < 1 and Cs,i 6= 0: If a combination of a stake in the project and cash
transfers is allowed, the equity stake, cash transfer and the investment threshold
are:
γs,i = ηi (17)
Cs,i = ηiI − Ii (18)
V
(γ,C)
s = V (19)
Proof. See Appendix A
As in the previous case, the stake in the project γs,i increases and the amount
of cash compensation Cs,i decreases with both firm i’s bargaining power, ηi, and its
contribution to the project, Ii. It also holds that ∂γs,i/∂k ≷ 0 for ηi ≷ Ii/I, so the
fraction of the project received increases with its volatility if firm i’s bargaining power
is sufficiently high. Moreover, cash compensation Cs,i unambiguously increases with
project volatility (cf. (15)).
In the absence of cash transfers, the investment threshold chosen by firm i decreases
as its bargaining power increases (i.e., ∂V (γ)s /∂ηi < 0). The reason is as follows. When
ηi is low, the firm’s equity stake γs,i is also low, so in order to receive a sufficiently
large payoff, the firm delays investment. On the other hand, when ηi is high, the firm’s
equity stake γs,i is also high, so in order to realize the large payoff sooner, the firm
hurries investment. The investment timing is always privately optimal for the firm ex
post, but is generally socially suboptimal, since V (γ)s 6= V . Only in the knife-edge case
of ηi = Ii/I, the delay is both privately and socially optimal. Consequently, in the
absence of cash transfers, a deal in which the decision how to split the surplus precedes
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the choice of the investment timing leads to an inefficiently timed option exercise. In
general, firm i invests too late when its bargaining power is low, and too early when its
bargaining power is high.16 Finally, the direction of the effect of volatility (via k) on the
investment delay (V (γ)s /V ) depends on the distribution of bargaining power. It holds
that ∂(V (γ)s /V )/∂k ≶ 0 for ηi ≷ Ii/I, which reflects the effect of k on the equity stake:
an increasing (decreasing) stake γs,i in response to an increase in volatility results in a
lower (higher) investment threshold V (γ)s (relative to V ) due to investment becoming
more (less) attractive.
When firm i compensates for the contribution of the other part fully in cash, the
investment threshold increases when firm i’s bargaining power decreases (∂V (C)s /∂ηi <
0. In other words, firm i delays investment longer when its bargaining position is
weaker. The rationale for this is as follows. The cash payment Cs,i is higher when the
firm i’s bargaining position is weaker (∂Cs,i/∂ηi < 0). And when Cs,i is higher, firm
i’s net payoff at the time of investment V − Cs,i − Ii is lower. Consequently, firm i
has to delay investment longer until it receives a sufficiently high payoff. The duration
of the delay is privately optimal for firm i, but for ∀ηi < 1 it is socially suboptimal
(V (C)s > V ). As ∂(V
(C)
s /V )/∂k > 0, higher volatility unambiguously exacerbates the
investment delay. Only when ηi = 1, this duration is both privately and socially
optimal. Therefore, in general, allowing for cash-only compensation with bargaining
taking place before the option is exercised leads to inefficiently late investment.
The last part of Proposition 2 describes the consequences of a cash transfer Cs,i
between firms when they bargain over the sharing rule γs,i. Unlike in the previous two
cases (Cs,i = 0 and γs,i = 1), in this case firm i always chooses the first-best investment
threshold. In other words, inefficiencies in investment timing observed in previous two
cases disappear when parties bargain over Cs,i as well as γs,i. The intuition is as follows.
The overall impact of ηi on V
(γ,C)
s can be decomposed into two parts:17
dV
(γ,C)
s
dηi
=
∂V
(γ,C)
s
∂γs,i
∂γs,i
∂ηi
+
∂V
(γ,C)
s
∂Cs,i
∂Cs,i
∂ηi
16The extreme form of former case (ηi = 0) corresponds to the hostile takeover in Lambrecht (2004).
In that situation the target firm chooses the stake in the joint firm that it requires to receive and the
raider chooses the timing of consummating the deal.
17Siddiqui and Takashima (2012) employ a similar approach when analyzing capacity switching
decisions in a non-preemptive duopoly.
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When ηi increases, firm i receives a higher equity stake, which incentivizes the firm to
accelerate investment:
∂V
(γ,C)
s
∂γs,i
∂γs,i
∂ηi
= −k(Ii + Cs,i)
γ2s,i
< 0
At the same time, the increase in ηi implies that firm i has to make a larger cash
payment to firm j. From firm i’s perspective, the larger cash payment is like an
additional fixed cost of investment, which incentivizes the firm to delay investment:
∂V
(γ,C)
s
∂Cs,i
∂Cs,i
∂ηi
=
kI
γs,i
> 0
When γs,i = ηi and Cs,i = ηiI − Ii, these contrarian incentives cancel out each other,
such that it is always optimal for firm i to choose the first-best investment threshold
regardless of its bargaining power ηi:
dV
(γ,C)
s
dηi
∣∣∣∣∣
γs,i=ηi, Cs,i=ηiI−Ii
= −k(Ii + ηiI − Ii)
η2i
+
kI
ηi
= 0
Like Proposition 1, Proposition 2 also has specific implications for the EF and JV
scenarios. In terms of the EF scenario, we can no longer separate the entrepreneur’s
investment timing decision from his financing decision, since the investment thresh-
old various across the financing choices, and the entrepreneur is no longer indifferent
between those choices. We examine this further in section 3.4. In terms of the JV sce-
nario, it is no longer guaranteed that each firm will have an incentive to invest at the
same time. That is, unless a combination of a stake in the project and cash transfers
is used, firms will be likely to disagree on the timing of entry to a joint venture. This
issue is discussed further in section 3.5.
3.4 Firm i’s choice
We have so far examined the timing and terms of investment under different contractual
forms in Propositions 1 and 2. In this section, we investigate firm i’s choice between
these contractual forms. This choice depends on firm i’s expected NPV, which is
determined by its claim (net of investment) on the project and the investment threshold
V m:
NPVm,i = (γm,iV m − Cm,i − Ii)
(
V0
V m
)β
(20)
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where m ∈ {e, s}. We define NPVe,i as firm i’s expected NPV when the exercise
decision is made first. Using equations (7)-(10) presented in Proposition 1, it is easy
to show that NPVe,i is always equal to ηi(k − 1)I(V0/kI)β regardless of whether cash
transfers are involved or not. We also define NPVs,i as firm i’s expected NPV when the
sharing rule is determined first. Unlike NPVe,i, the value of NPVs,i changes when only
equity stakes or cash transfers are involved. Therefore, we use the notation NPV (C)s,i
when firm i acquires the full rights to project such that γi = 1, and NPV
(γ)
s,i when cash
transfers are not allowed such that Ci = 0. Finally, the notation NPV
(γ,C)
s,i implies
that a combination of a stake in the project and cash transfers is used.
Proposition 3 (Firm i’s choice) Firm i is indifferent between making the exercise
decision first versus determining the sharing rule first, such that in the latter case the
sharing rule involves a combination of a stake in the project and cash transfers:
NPVe,i = NPV
(γ,C)
s,i (21)
For 0 ≤ ηi < 1, firm i prefers to determine the sharing rule first and obtain full rights
to the project at the time of investment:
NPV
(C)
s,i > max
(
NPV
(γ,C)
s,i , NPV
(γ)
s,i
)
(22)
For ηi = 1, when the sharing rule is determined first, firm i is indifferent between
obtaining full rights to the project at the time of investment versus sharing the project’s
ownership with a cash transfer, and prefers these two options over having no cash
transfers:
NPV
(C)
s,i = NPV
(γ,C)
s,i > NPV
(γ)
s,i (23)
Proof. See Appendix A
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 1 for the following set of parameter values:
Ii = 25, Ij = 75, V0 = 100, and β = 2. When the sharing rule is decided first, firm i
almost always prefers to acquire full rights to the project and invests inefficiently late
(see the solid lines in panels (a) and (b)). Only when ηi = 1, it is indifferent between
this option and sharing the project’s ownership with firm j and having a cash transfer,
in which case firm i’s investment policy is socially optimal. Interestingly, according to
Proposition 3, firm i prefers to decide the sharing rule first, since its expected NPV
in this case is always higher compared to the case when the exercise decision is made
first, except when ηi = 1, in which case it is indifferent.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
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We interpret Proposition 3 in the context of the EF scenario as follows. The en-
trepreneur almost always prefers debt financing with terms fixed first. Only when he
has full bargaining power he is indifferent between this option and mixed financing
with terms first (i.e., the last option in Proposition 2) or any type of financing with
timing fixed first (i.e., the options in Proposition 1).
The intuition behind the entrepreneur’s choice is as follows. When the exercise
decision is made first, the entrepreneur kills his option to invest before bargaining,
whereas when the sharing rule is decided first, his option to invest is still alive after
bargaining. In the former case, the entrepreneur has an incentive to maximize the
project’s expected NPV, since he anticipates that he will receive a fixed fraction of the
project’s NPV. In the latter case, since bargaining has already taken place, he has an
incentive to maximize the expected NPV of his claim on the project. In other words,
there is an agency problem (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)) when the entrepreneur
makes the investment timing decision ex post.18
It is worth emphasizing that the entrepreneur’s dominant choice is pure debt fi-
nancing, equivalent to a commitment to paying the present value of Ci to the financier,
with terms fixed first. He never prefers pure equity financing (except for the case when
ηi = 1 and timing being fixed first, when he is indifferent between any combination of
debt and equity financing). As it stands there is no demand for pure equity financing
in this setting. We return to this point in section 4 when we consider the possibility
that the entrepreneur can divert part of the project’s value.
3.5 Alignment of investment incentives with the sharing rule
When the exercise decision is made first, Proposition 1 suggests that each firm has an
incentive to invest at the same time, which is also the socially optimal timing of invest-
ment. However, when the sharing rule is determined first, according to Proposition 2,
firms will generally not agree on investment timing, especially when a combination of a
stake in the project and cash transfers cannot be used. This is problematic particularly
for the JV scenario, since the joint nature of the real option to start a joint venture
requires that firms agree on timing as well as terms of investment. One way to align
investment timing incentives is to design a sharing rule with effectively an endogenous
bargaining power distribution which gives each firm an incentive to invest at the same
time, as in Morellec and Zhdanov (2005).
18Note that a suboptimal investment policy arises despite the fact that there is no asymmetric
information between the entrepreneur and the investor (cf. Mæland (2002)and Grenadier and Wang
(2005)), and when the entrepreneur is risk neutral (cf. Hugonnier and Morellec (2007) and Chronopou-
los, De Reyck, and Siddiqui (2011)).
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Proposition 4 (Alignment of investment incentives with the sharing rule) Firms
i and j have incentives to invest at the same time when the sharing rule satisfies:
γs,i =
Ii + Cs,i
I
(24)
The jointly-agreed investment threshold is always V .
Proof. See Appendix A
Proposition 2 showed that when the sharing rule is decided first with Nash bar-
gaining, each firm adopts the socially optimal investment policy only if a combination
of a stake in the project and cash transfers is used (i.e., 0 < γs,i < 1 and Cs,i 6= 0).
This is consistent with Proposition 4, since γs,i and Cs,i given in equations (17) and
(18) satisfy equation (24). If no cash transfers are allowed (i.e., Cs,i = 0), according
to equation (24), for each firm to choose the same threshold, which is V , γs,i has to
be equal to Ii/I. In other words, firms agree on the timing of investment in the joint
venture when each firm’s stake is proportional to its investment. If the sharing rule
is determined by Nash bargaining this occurs only when ηi = Ii/I (see equations (13)
and (14), and the point the dotted line intersects the dashed one in panel (b) of Figure
1). On the other hand, if firm i obtains the full rights to the project by compensating
firm j (i.e., γs,i = 1), then each firm chooses to invest when the project value reaches
V only if Ci = Ij. This means that firm i pays firm j the investment amount the latter
contributes to the project. If the firms play a Nash bargaining game, this sharing rule
is obtained only when ηi = 1 (see equations (15) and (16), and the point the solid line
intersect the dashed one in panel (b) of Figure 1).
In the context of the JV scenario the following corollary follows from Propositions
1, 2, and 4.
Corollary 1 Firms i and j agree on the exercise of their joint real option to form a
joint venture in the following cases:
1. When the exercise decision is made first.
2. When the sharing rule is decided first through Nash Bargaining and:
(a) a combination of a stake in the project and cash transfers is used.
(b) no cash transfer is used and ηi = Ii/I.
(c) Firm i obtains full rights to the project and ηi = 1.
3. When the sharing rule is decided first and equation (24) is satisfied.
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A joint venture between firms i and j is not feasible when the sharing rule is decided
first through Nash Bargaining and: (1) no cash transfer is used and ηi 6= Ii/I, (2) firm
i obtains full rights to the project and ηi 6= 1. In these two cases firms cannot agree on
the timing of entry.
It is worth noting that a joint venture would always be feasible if the parties could
write an enforceable contract on the investment threshold. Under such a scenario,
forming the joint venture is always desirable for both parties, since each party’s dis-
agreement payoff is zero. However, the investment threshold is a function of the level
of the state variable, which is the value of the project. Since the project is not traded
on financial markets and a verifiable price for it does not exist, it would prove very
difficult, if not impossible, to verify in a court whether or not the investment took
place at the agreed threshold (see also the discussion at the beginning of Section 2 and
footnote ?? in particular).
3.6 Multiple firms (N ≥ 3)
There are economic situations in which more than two firms are involved in the bar-
gaining process. For instance, an entrepreneur can be bargaining with a number of
investors for outside financing, or multiple firms can be holding a joint real option to
form a joint venture. Our framework can be extended to accommodate N ≥ 3 firms.
Proposition 5 (Multiple firms (N ≥ 3)) The results obtained in Propositions 1 and
2 do not change when N ≥ 3 firms bargain over the sharing rule and one firm (firm i)
makes the investment timing decision. In particular, if the exercise decision is made
first, the investment threshold is:
V N≥3 = V (25)
If the sharing rule is determined first:
V N≥3 =

V
(γ)
s Ci = 0
V
(C)
s γi = 0
V
(γ,C)
s = V 0 < γi < 1, Ci 6= 0
(26)
Proof. See Appendix A
If the timing of the option exercise is chosen first and the Nash bargaining follows, it
is still irrelevant which of the parties chooses the investment threshold. Furthermore,
all payment forms (equity stakes only, cash transfer only, and a mixture of equity
stakes and cash transfers) lead to the efficient outcome. If firms first bargain about the
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sharing rule and only subsequently choose the exercise threshold, the exercise policy
is inefficient if no cash transfers are allowed or if one firm assumes a full control over
the project and provides cash compensation to all other parties.19 Once cash transfers
are allowed at least between the firm choosing the investment threshold and any other
firm, efficiency is restored. Still, the investment policy maximizes in such a case the
overall project value but not necessarily the individual values of firms’ stakes in the
project. Only if cash transfers among all firms are allowed, the optimal investment
threshold maximizes all individual equity stake values.20
4 Effects of the value diversion threat
When interpreting Proposition 3 in the context of the EF scenario, we argued that the
entrepreneur almost always prefers debt financing with terms fixed first. This result
may seem intriguing, since in reality we observe a more diverse set of financial contracts.
In particular, there is almost no scope for equity financing in the context of Proposition
3. In this section, we extend our analysis to include the possibility that firm i diverts
a fraction of the project’s value when investment takes place. We demonstrate that
such a possibility of value diversion may rationalize equity financing.
Value diversion comes under many guises in corporate finance. In Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976), a manager with a low equity stake can reduce firm’s value by increasing
his consumption of non-pecuniary benefits. In Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000),
a controlling shareholder can extract private benefits at a deadweight cost, and when
the control is transferred via a block sale the buyer receives the block’s total value
(i.e., private benefits as well as security benefits). Finally, in Bernardo, Cai, and Luo
(2001), value diversion takes the form of poor managerial effort and empire building. If
we consider the EF scenario in which firm i is interpreted as an entrepreneur and firm
j as an investor, value diversion occurs, for example, when the entrepreneur consumes
private benefits by shirking after investment instead of working hard on the project.
This harms the investor, since it lowers the project’s value. However, the entrepreneur
can find shirking optimal, since he bears only part of the decline in the project’s value,
19Cash compensation can also be viewed as an employment contract. Then, it is not optimal for a
lead inventor (firm i), who assumes the full business risk, to compensate cooperating inventors with
fixed salaries.
20The Nash bargaining solution determines values of N−1 choice variables (γis). The maximization
of the individual equity stake values of N firms requires further N − 1 choice variables. Therefore,
net payments of each firm can serve as these required additional choice variables (the new payment of
Nth firm is just an opposite number to the sum of all the other N − 1 payments. If, conversely, only
one cash transfer is allowed, only one firm can optimize its investment threshold. Obviously, those
two cases coincide when N = 2.
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but exclusively appropriates the benefits of private benefits consumption. As in stan-
dard moral hazard problem, we assume that value diversion is not verifiable by court
(which follows from an earlier assumption that V is not verifiable). Therefore, the only
way in which it can be avoided is by providing adequate incentives to the entrepreneur
(firm i).
We introduce two new parameters in order to investigate the effects of value diver-
sion in our setting. φ is the fraction of value firm i can divert when the investment
takes place, and θ is the fraction of diverted value firm i can appropriate, whereby
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. In other words, value diversion is inefficient such that it
has a deadweight cost of (1 − θ)φV . Firm i has a choice between behaving (no value
diversion) and misbehaving.21 Its choice is determined by an incentive compatibility
constraint (ICC). For instance, when firms i and j share the project value with no cash
transfers, the ICC is γiV ≥ γi(1 − φ)V + θφV , which simplifies to γi ≥ θ.22 In other
words, firm i prefers to behave when its equity stake is at least as large as its efficiency
of value diversion.
The fact that firm i has incentives to divert value when its equity stake is low
affects the bargaining that takes place between the firms. To illustrate this point, we
consider the case when the sharing rule is decided first. At the end of bargaining if
the ICC holds (i.e., γi ≥ θ), firm i behaves and chooses the investment threshold that
maximizes its NPV:
max
V
(γiV − Ii)
(
V0
V
)β
θ ≤ γi ≤ 1 (27)
However, if the ICC is violated (i.e., γi < θ), firm i diverts value. It appropriates
fraction θ of the diverted value φV (for example to consume private benefits) and
also shares the remaining value (1− φ)V with firm j according to the sharing rule γi.
Importantly, firm i cares about θφV as well as γi(1−φ)V when choosing the investment
threshold:
max
V
((γi(1− φ) + θφ)V − Ii)
(
V0
V
)β
0 ≤ γi < θ (28)
As a result, when bargaining over γi, firms have to take into account firm i’s ex post
behavior as well as its investment timing decision. Thus, both the terms and timing of
21One can also interpret V as the value of the project if party i (manager) exerts effort and V (1−θ)
otherwise. Effort is not contractible so the moral hazard problem occurs. Party i will only exert effort
if its compensation is greater than the cost of effort equal to θφV . A related problem with the benefit
of effort being stochastic is analyzed in Grenadier and Wang (2005).
22This is also true when cash transfers are allowed. On the other hand, when firm i obtains full
rights to the project by transferring Ci to firm j, the ICC is: V − Ci ≥ (1− φ)V + θφV − Ci, which
simplifies into: 1 ≥ θ. In other words, firm i always behaves in this case, since it has a full claim on
the residual project value.
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investment depend on θ and φ.
Proposition 6 (Value diversion) If firms i and j decide the sharing rule first with-
out cash transfers and if firm i can divert value, the terms and timing of investment
are as follows.
(γv,i, V v) =

(γs,i, V
(γ)
s ) 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1(
γs,i − θφ(1− γs,i)
1− φ ,
V
(γ)
s
1− φ+ θφ
)
φ ≤ φ∗, θ < θ ≤ θ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ
(θ, kIi/θ) φ > φ
∗, θ < θ ≤ θ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ
(θ, kIi/θ) θ ≤ θ∗, θ < θ ≤ θ, φ < φ ≤ 1
(0, kIi/θφ) θ > θ
∗, θ < θ ≤ θ, φ < φ ≤ 1(
γs,i − θφ(1− γs,i)
1− φ ,
V
(γ)
s
1− φ+ θφ
)
θ < θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ
(0, kIi/θφ) θ < θ ≤ 1, φ < φ ≤ φ
∅ θ < θ ≤ 1, φ < φ ≤ 1
where θ, θ, φ, φ, φ∗ and θ∗ are defined by equations A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7, and A.8,
respectively, in Appendix A.
Proof. See Appendix A
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
From Proposition 2, we know that when firms bargain over the sharing rule with
no cash transfers, the outcome is γs,i as given in equation (13). For low values of
θ (θ ≤ θ), this outcome stays the same, since γs,i ≥ θ. Firm i diverts value very
inefficiently, so it has no incentives to misbehave. This outcome corresponds to region
No diversion threat in Figure 2 (the set of parameter values used is ηi = 0.1, β = 2
and Ii = Ij). However when θ is not low (θ > θ = 0.367), γs,i < θ and firm i has
incentives to misbehave. In this situation, two things can happen. Firms can either
agree to raise firm i’s equity stake to θ in order to incentivize it to behave, or lower
it to γs,i − θφ(1 − γs,i)/(1 − φ) in order to take into account the fact that firm i will
divert value when investment occurs.
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The former outcome becomes more likely when θ gets lower and φ gets higher (see
Incentivization in Figure 2). When θ gets lower, a smaller increase in firm i’s equity
stake is sufficient to incentivize this firm. When φ gets higher, it is more costly to
let firm i misbehave because the value lost due to its misbehavior (1− θ)φV becomes
larger. When incentivization occurs, the value of firm i’s option to invest increases (see
(θ = 0.5, φ = 0.4) versus (θ < 0.367) in Figure 3) due to the fact its equity stake jumps
from γs,i to θ. It follows that firm i accelerates the investment.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The latter outcome becomes more likely when θ gets higher and φ gets lower (see
Diversion with reduced stake in Figure 2). When θ gets higher, incentivizing firm
i leaves only a small fraction of the project value 1 − θ for firm j. When φ gets
lower, it becomes less costly to let firm i misbehave, since it only diverts a small
fraction of the project’s value. For both of these reasons, firm j prefers to let firm i
misbehave rather than relinquishing part of its equity in order to incentivize firm i.
When diversion occurs, the value of firm i’s option to invest falls (see (θ = 0.7, φ = 0.4)
versus (θ < 0.367) in Figure 3) due to the deadweight cost of value diversion. Thus,
firm i delays the investment.
When firm i is let to misbehave, its stake in the project goes down as φ gets larger.
This is because firm j anticipates that a larger fraction of the project value will be
diverted and bargains firm i’s stake down. However, firm i’s stake cannot go below
zero due to limited liability. Consequently, when φ exceeds φ(θ), firm j receives 100%
of the project’s value (1− φ)V , and firm i is compensated by the value it appropriates
from the diverted value θφV (Pure diversion in Figure 2). Firm i’s option to invest
is more valuable in the case of pure diversion compared to the case of diversion with
reduced stake (see (θ = 0.7, φ = 0.6) versus (θ = 0.7, φ = 0.4) in Figure 3), since the
limited liability prevents firm i’s equity stake from becoming negative.
Interestingly, when θ and φ are both high (θ > θ = 0.667 and φ > φ(θ)), the
bargaining breaks down (No equilibrium region in Figure 2). The reason is as follows.
One one hand, if firm j incentivizes firm i, there is too little equity left for firm j to
break even: (1 − θ)(kIi/θ) < Ij. On the other hand, if firm j lets firm i misbehave,
it receives 100% of the project’s value, but it again cannot break even because firm i
diverts a very large fraction of the project’s value: (1 − φ)(kIi/θφ) < Ij. As a result,
firm j refuses to contribute to the project. An increase in Ii or any action that restrains
θ and φ, such as monitoring, can resolve the issue.
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Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that ∂θ/∂k > 0 and ∂φ/∂k > 0 so the No
equilibrium region shrinks when project volatility increases. This result is fairly intu-
itive as higher volatility boosts the option value to invest in the project and foregoing
the investment due to the lack of agreement becomes more costly. Finally, as ∂θ/∂k ≷ 0
for ηi ≷ Ii/I, the range of parameter values for which the threat of diversion exists
shrinks with volatility as long as the bargaining power of the firm that can make such
a threat is sufficiently high. Again, the latter result is a consequence of firm i receiving
a higher equity stake, which makes value diversion less attractive.
In section 3.3 we discussed that firm i almost always prefers to obtain full rights
to the project by compensating firm j with a cash transfer at the time of investment
(see Proposition 3). In terms of the EF scenario, this meant that the entrepreneur’s
predominant choice is pure debt financing and there is no demand for pure equity
financing. Now, we allow for the possibility that firm i can divert value at the time of
investment and re-examine firm i’s choice between obtaining full rights to the project
(γs,i = 1) and sharing the project’s value without cash transfers (Cs,i = 0).
Proposition 7 (Firm i’s choice when it can misbehave) Results obtained in Propo-
sition 3 continue to hold except in the following two cases when firm i prefers sharing
the project’s value without cash transfers:
1. When firm i’s stake is γv,i = θ due to incentive compatibility and ηi < η∗, where:
η∗ = β − Ii
I
β − 1
θk
(29)
2. When firm i’s stake is γv,i = 0 due to limited liability and ηi < η∗∗, where:
η∗∗ = β − Ii
I
β − 1
(θφ)k
(30)
Proof. See Appendix A
In regards to the EF scenario, Proposition 7 implies that pure debt financing is
no longer the entrepreneur’s dominant financing choice, such that he can demand pure
equity financing as well. The fact that the entrepreneur can prefer pure equity financing
when either the incentive compatibility constraint or the limited liability constraint is
binding makes intuitive sense. In the former case, his equity stake is raised to θ, so
that he behaves. In the latter case, it is raised to zero, so that limited liability is not
violated. Of course, in both cases, the increase in his equity stake boosts his expected
NPV and makes equity financing more attractive. Furthermore, the increase in his
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equity stake is particularly valuable for the entrepreneur when his bargaining power ηi
is low, since when ηi is high he is already appropriating a large fraction of the surplus.
In summary, the findings in this section provide the following insights. The presence
of value diversion threat has an impact on both the exercise and the sharing rule
decisions and causes distortions in investment timing. The impact of value diversion
threat on firm i’s value of the option to invest is illustrated in Figure 3. Furthermore,
value diversion threat rationalizes pure equity contracts when firm i is incentivized to
behave. This makes intuitive sense, since firm i’s equity stake in the project is raised
for the sake of incentivization and as a result a pure equity contract becomes more
attractive for this firm. Finally, the possibility of value diversion leads to a rich set of
interesting scenarios as illustrated in Figure 2. For example, when the fraction of value
diverted is small (i.e., the parameter φ is low) and the deadweight cost of misbehavior
is low (i.e., the parameter θ is high), firms find it optimal to let firm i misbehave rather
than incentivize it.23
5 Conclusions
We study the optimal exercise of jointly held real options in a two-stage framework,
in which firms have to agree on the terms and timing of investment. Firms can have
different levels of bargaining power and each bears a specific portion of the investment
cost. They decide on either the timing or the terms first. Furthermore, we allow for
the diversion of some of the project’s value by the firm that makes the timing decision.
In this framework, we obtain a broad set of results on investment efficiency and
financing policy. First, when the exercise decision is made first, investment always
occurs at a socially optimal time regardless of the financing policy and which firm
makes the exercise decision. However, when the sharing rule is determined first, the
first-best solution can be attained only if a combination of a stake in the project and
cash transfers is used. This finding can explain the extensive use of participating
convertible preferred equity in venture capital contracting, which can be viewed as a
combination of straight preferred stock (a debt-like instrument) and common stock
(Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)).
One of the interpretations of our framework is the interaction of a wealth-constrained
entrepreneur with an investor. When the sharing rule is determined first, a debt con-
tract that resembles a loan commitment is the dominant form of financing for the
entrepreneur. This result may help explain the high demand for loan commitment
23This case can be reinterpreted as a combination of a relatively high cost and low benefit of effort,
which results in no effort being exerted in the equilibrium.
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contracts, which constitute over 80% of all commercial and industrial loans in the US
(Shockley and Thakor (1997)).
Equity financing is rationalized when there is a possibility that the entrepreneur
can divert value from the project at a deadweight cost. Equity financing becomes more
attractive for instance when the investor incentivizes the entrepreneur by increasing his
equity stake. New ventures in high-tech industries are more prone to imposing a value
diversion threat, since such firms can divert value more easily and efficiently owing to
the higher difficulty in verifying their cash flows compared to, for instance, mature firms
in traditional industries. Therefore, equity financing should be particularly attractive
for such firms, a conjecture that agrees with the results in Berger and Udell (1998).
The framework developed in the paper can potentially be extended further by
relaxing some of the model’s limiting assumptions. For instance, more than one party
can be allowed to divert value from the project to investigate the impact of multiple
value diversion threats. Furthermore, a more extensive analysis of the moral hazard
problem could follow from our framework. Currently, we only allow for a deterministic
technology of value diversion (equivalent to deterministic benefit of effort). Introducing
randomness is likely to reduce the range of parameter values for which incentivizing
the firm that takes the investment decision is optimal. Allowing for a broader contract
space could, in turn, enable a closer alignment of interests and increase the region in
which incentivization prevails. Finally, it would be interesting to relax the assumption
of risk neutrality. In a setting related to ours, Cvitanić et al (2011) demonstrate
that risk aversion affects the design of venture capital contracts, whereas Hugonnier
and Morellec (2007) show that a risk averse entrepreneur speeds up investment and
invests inefficiently early. At this stage, we are able to make the following preliminary
conjectures concerning the effect of risk aversion on the results. First, if firm i is risk
averse and allowed to divert value, firm j anticipates that the former will accelerate
investment. Furthermore, firm j also anticipates that the investment will be accelerated
further if it incentivizes firm i, since the latter’s equity stake is increased. Thus, we
conjecture that the set of parameter values for which firm i is incentivized will be
smaller to reflect the inefficient acceleration in investment resulting from risk aversion.
Second, when firm j lets firm i misbehave, investment is typically excessively delayed
due to the deadweight cost of value diversion that lowers the project value. However,
a risk-averse firm i will not delay investment as much, which works in favor of firm j.
Thus, we expect that the region in which firm j lets firm i misbehave will expand. We
leave a formal analysis of these extended decision frameworks for future research.
25
A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The first order conditions of (5) yield the sharing rule γi and Ci
as a function of the investment threshold V :
γi(V ) =
Ii + Ci + ηi(V − I)
V
Ci(V ) = γiV − Ii − ηi(V − I)
Plugging γi(V ) and Ci(V ) into (6) yields:
max
V
[ηi(V − I)]
(
V0
V
)β
The solution to this maximization problem is V e = kI = V .
For the polar case when there is no cash exchange (Ci = Cj = 0):
γe,i =
Ii + Ci + ηi(V e − I)
V e
=
Ii + ηi(k − 1)I
kI
For the other polar case when firm i gains the rights to the project (γi = 1, γj = 0):
Ce,i = γiV e − Ii − ηi(V e − I) = Ij + ηj(k − 1)I
For the remaining cases, any (γe,i, Ce,i) pair is feasible if it satisfies:24
γe,ikI + Ce,i − Ii = ηi(k − 1)I
Proof of Proposition 2. The first order condition of (11) yields the investment
threshold V as a function of the sharing rule γi and Ci:
V (γi, Ci) =
k(Ii + Ci)
γi
Plugging V (γi, Ci) into (12) yields:
max
γi,Ci
[(k − 1)(Ii + Ci)]ηi[
k(Ii+Ci)
γi
− (k − 1)(Ii + Ci)− I
]ηi−1
(
γiV0
k(Ii + Ci)
)β
24This condition simply says that any (γe,i, Ce,i) pair is feasible so long as firm i’s net claim γe,iV +
Ce,i − Ii is worth fraction ηi of the project’s surplus V − I.
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We maximize the natural logarithm of the expression above. The first-order conditions yield:
γi =
Ii + Ci + ηi(k − 1)(Ii + Ci)
I + (k − 1)(Ii + Ci) (A.1)
Ci = γiI
β − ηi
β − γi − Ii (A.2)
Solving (A.1) and (A.2) yields γs,i = ηi and Cs,i = ηiI − Ii. V (ηi, ηiI − Ii) is equal to
V
(γ,C)
s = kI = V .
For the polar case when there is no cash exchange, set Ci = 0 and use (A.1) to obtain:
γs,i =
Ii + ηi(k − 1)Ii
I + (k − 1)Ii
V ([Ii + ηi(k − 1)Ii]/[I + (k − 1)Ii], 0) is equal to:
V
(γ)
s =
1 + (Ii/I)(k − 1)
1 + ηi(k − 1) V
For the other polar case, set γi = 1 and use (A.2) to obtain:
Cs,i = Ij + ηj(k − 1)I
V (1, Ij + (1− ηi)(k − 1)I) is equal to:
V
(C)
s = (1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))V
Proof of Proposition 3. It is straightforward to prove the part that NPVe,i =
NPV
(γ,C)
s,i . Proposition 1 shows that when the exercise decision is made first, firm i always
chooses the first-best investment threshold V . Its net payoff at the time of investment is
γe,iV − Ii when Ce,i = 0, V −Ce,i − Ii when γe,i = 1, and γe,iV −Ce,i − Ii when 0 < γe,i < 1
and Ce,i 6= 0). The net payoff is equal to ηi(V − I) in each of these three cases. Furthermore,
Proposition 2 shows that when the sharing rule is determined first, firm i still chooses V when
(0 < γs,i < 1 and Cs,i 6= 0). Its net payoff in this case is γs,iV −Cs,i− Ii, which is again equal
to ηi(V − I). Consequently, we have NPVe,i = NPV (γ,C)s,i .
Next, we prove the part that firm i always prefers to buy out firm j’s ownership stake
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(γs,i = 1) rather than sharing the project’s ownership with no cash transfers (Cs,i = 0):
NPV
(C)
s,i = (V
(C)
s − Cs,i − Ii)
(
V0
V
(C)
s
)β
≶ NPV (γ)s,i = (γs,iV
(γ)
s − Ii)
(
V0
V
(γ)
s
)β
(1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))1−β(k − 1)I
(
V0
kI
)β
≶ (k − 1)Ii
(
(1 + ηi(k − 1))V0
kI + k(k − 1)Ii
)β
(1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))1−β ≶ Ii
I
(
(1 + ηi(k − 1))
1 + (k − 1)Ii/I
)β
1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1)
(β + ηi(1− ηi)(k − 1))β ≶
Ii/I
(β − 1 + Ii/I)β
Firm i always prefers the option γs,i = 1, since:25
1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1)
(β + ηi(1− ηi)(k − 1))β >
Ii/I
(β − 1 + Ii/I)β for 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1
Finally, we prove that firm i prefers to buy out firm j’s ownership stake (γs,i = 1) rather
than sharing the project’s ownership with a cash transfer (0 < γs,i < 1 and Cs,i 6= 0) when
ηi < 1 and that it is indifferent between these two options when ηi = 1:
NPV
(C)
s,i = (V
(C)
s − Cs,i − Ii)
(
V0
V
(C)
s
)β
≶ NPV (γ,C)s,i = (γ
(γ,C)
s,i V
(γ,C)
s − C(γ,C)s,i − Ii)
(
V0
V
(γ,C)
s
)β
(1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))1−β(k − 1)I
(
V0
kI
)β
≶ ηi(k − 1)I
(
V0
kI
)β
(
β − 1
β − ηi
)β−1
≶ ηi
Firm i prefers the option γs,i = 1 when ηi < 1, since:(
β − 1
β − ηi
)β−1
> ηi for 0 ≤ ηi < 1
It is indifferent between the options γs,i = 1 and 0 < γs,i < 1 and Cs,i 6= 0 when ηi = 1, since:(
β − 1
β − ηi
)β−1
= ηi for ηi = 1
25In order to see why the inequality holds, set Ii = I and ηi = 1, in which case the inequality becomes
an equality, since both sides are equal to 1/ββ . If ηi changes to an arbitrary value e ∈ [0, 1), the right
hand side is unaffected, but the left hand side increases, and the inequality holds. Furthermore, if Ii
changes to an arbitrary value in [0, I] while ηi is fixed at e, the inequality continues to hold, since the
left hand side is unaffected and the right hand side is either unaffected (if Ii = I) or falls (if Ii < I).
Therefore, the inequality holds for 0 ≤ ηi < 1 and 0 ≤ Ii ≤ I and for ηi = 1 and 0 ≤ Ii < I. Note
that the case Ii = I is not interesting, since firm i can finance the project without firm j. Thus, we
assume Ii < I, in which case the inequality holds for 0 ≤ ηi ≤ 1.
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Proof of Proposition 4. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, firm i’s exercise
decision given a sharing rule is:
V (γi, Ci) =
k(Ii + Ci)
γi
Then, firm j’s exercise decision given a sharing rule is:
V (γj , Cj) =
k(Ij + Cj)
γj
=
k(I − Ii − Ci)
1− γi
Setting V (γi, Ci) = V (γj , Cj) and simplifying yields:
γi =
Ii + Ci
I
Any sharing rule that satisfies this equation induces each firm to invest at the same time.
Furthermore, each firm always invests optimally, since: V (γi, γiI − Ii) = V .
Proof of Proposition 5. We first prove that results in Proposition 1 stay the same
when firm i makes the exercise decision first and then many firms bargain over the sharing
rule. In this situation the bargaining problem is:
max
γi,Ci,γj ,Cj ,...
[γiV − Ci − Ii]ηi [γjV − Cj − Ij)]ηj · · ·
The first order conditions for γi and γj imply:
ηiV
γiV − Ci − Ii =
ηjV
γjV − Cj − Ij
The cross multiplication yields:
ηiγjV − ηiCj − ηiIj = ηj(γiV − Ci − Ii)
There are N − 1 many such equations for firm pairs i and j (j 6= i). Adding them up yields:
ηi(1− γi)V + ηiCi − ηi(I − Ii) = (1− ηi)(γiV − Ci − Ii)
since Σγi = 1, ΣCi = 0, Σηi = 1, and ΣIi = I. Then, solving for γi yields the same first order
condition in Proposition 1.
Similarly, the first order conditions for Ci and Cj imply:
−ηi
γiV − Ci − Ii =
−ηj
γjV − Cj − Ij
Taking the cross multiplication, adding N − 1 such equations, and solving for Ci yields the
same first order condition in Proposition 1. As a result, the rest of the proof becomes identical
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to the proof of Proposition 1.
We next prove that results in Proposition 2 stay the same when many firms bargain over
the sharing rule first and then firm i makes the exercise decision. In this situation, once the
sharing rule is fixed firm i chooses V (γi, Ci) = k(Ii +Ci)/γi (see the proof of Proposition 2).
Firms bargain anticipating this threshold such that:
max
γi,Ci,γj ,Cj ,...
[γi
k(Ii + Ci)
γi
− Ci − Ii]ηi [γj k(Ii + Ci)
γi
− Cj − Ij ]ηj · · ·
(
γiV0
k(Ii + Ci)
)β
The first order conditions for γi and γj imply:
β
γi
− γj
γi
ηjk(Ci + Ii)
γjk(Ci + Ii)− γi(Cj + Ij) − · · · =
ηjk(Ci + Ii)
γjk(Ci + Ii)− γi(Cj + Ij)
Define the right hand side of above equation as Zj and note that Zj = Z for all j 6= i. Then
the above equation becomes:
β
γi
− (1− γi)Z
γi
= Z
which is equivalent to:
β =
ηjk(Ci + Ii)
γjk(Ci + Ii)− γi(Cj + Ij)
The cross multiplication yields:
γjk(Ci + Ii)− γi(Cj + Ij) = ηj(k − 1)(Ci + Ii)
There are N − 1 many such equations for firm pairs i and j (j 6= i). Adding them up yields:
(1− γi)k(Ci + Ii)− γi(−Ci + I − Ii) = (1− ηi)(k − 1)(Ci + Ii)
since Σγi = 1, ΣCi = 0, Σηi = 1, and ΣIi = I. Then, solving for γi yields the same first order
condition in Proposition 2.
Similarly, the first order conditions for Ci and Cj imply:
ηi − β
Ci + Ii
+
kγj
γi
ηj
γjk(Ii+Ci)
γi
− Cj − Ij
+ · · · = −ηj
γjk(Ii+Ci)
γi
− Cj − Ij
Define the right hand side of above equation as −Z ′j and note that Z ′j = Z ′ for all j 6= i.
Then the above equation becomes:
ηi − β
Ci + Ii
+
k(1− γi)Z ′
γi
= −Z ′
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which is equivalent to:
Ci + Ii =
γi(β − ηi)(Cj + Ij)
kγj(β − ηi)− k(1− γi)ηj − γiηj
Taking the cross multiplication, adding N − 1 such equations, and solving for Ci yields the
same first order condition in Proposition 2. As a result, the rest of the proof becomes identical
to the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 6. The first order conditions of (27) and (28) yield the investment
threshold V as a function of the sharing rule γi:
V (γi) =
 kIi/γi θ ≤ γi ≤ 1
kIi/[γi(1− φ) + θφ] 0 ≤ γi < θ
Thus, firms i and j maximize the Nash Product N with respect to γi anticipating that firm
i will invest when the project value reaches V (γi), where:
N =

N1 ≡ (γiV (γi)−Ii)
ηi
((1−γi)V (γi)−Ij)−ηj
(
V0
V (γi)
)β
subject to θ ≤ γi ≤ 1
N2 ≡ ((γi(1−φ)+θφ)V (γi)−Ii)
ηi
((1−γi)(1−φ)V (γi)−Ij)−ηj
(
V0
V (γi)
)β
subject to 0 ≤ γi < θ
Our first step is to identify the unconstrained and constrained maximums of N1 and N2.
The unconstrained maximum of N1 is attained when γv,i = γs,i, in which case V (γv,i) =
V
(γ)
s . Incentive compatibility requires that γv,i be at least as large as θ. Then, the maximum
of N1 is constrained when:
θ > γs,i =
Ii + ηi(k − 1)Ii
I + (k − 1)Ii ≡ θ (A.3)
The binding constraint implies γv,i = θ, in which case V (θ) = kIi/θ. Finally, N1 is positive
so long as firm j breaks even:
(1− γv,i)Vv,i ≥ Ij
(1− θ)kIi
θ
≥ Ij
θ ≤ Ii + (k − 1)Ii
I + (k − 1)Ii ≡ θ (A.4)
As a result, for 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ firm i behaves, for θ < θ ≤ θ, it can be incentivized to behave, and
for θ < θ ≤ 1, firms cannot agree on an equity stake that incentivizes firm i to behave.
We repeat the same analysis for N2. The unconstrained maximum of N2 is attained when
γv,i = γs,i − θφ(1− γs,i)/(1− φ), in which case V (γv,i) = V (γ)s /(1− φ+ θφ). Limited liability
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requires that γv,i be at least as large as zero. Then, the maximum of N2 is constrained when:
0 > γs,i − θφ(1− γs,i)
(1− φ)
φ >
θ
θ + (1− θ)θ ≡ φ (A.5)
The binding constraint implies γv,i = 0, in which case V (0) = kIi/θφ. Finally, N2 stays
positive so long as firm j breaks even:
(1− γv,i)(1− φ)Vv,i ≥ Ij
(1− φ)kIi
θφ
≥ Ij
φ ≤ θ
θ + (1− θ)θ ≡ φ (A.6)
As a result, for 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ firm i diverts value and has some equity in the remaining project
value, for φ < φ ≤ φ, firm i diverts value, but has no equity in the remaining project value,
and for φ < φ ≤ 1, firms cannot agree on an equity stake that lets firm i misbehave.
N1 is defined over 3 regions specified by θ and θ. Analogously, N2 is defined over 3 regions
specified by φ and φ. The intersection of these regions forms 3× 3 = 9 regions. We label the
three regions for θ as follows. If θ ≤ θ, θ is low; if θ < θ ≤ θ, θ is moderate; and if θ > θ,
θ is high. We also label the three regions for φ in the same fashion. Then, (low, low) refers
to the intersection of θ ≤ θ with φ ≤ φ, (low,moderate) to the intersection of θ ≤ θ with
φ < φ ≤ φ, and so on. What remains to be done is to find max(N1, N2) in each of these 9
regions.
For (low, low), (low,moderate) and (low, high), N1 is always larger than N2. The uncon-
strained maximum of N2 is bound to be lower than the unconstrained maximum of N1, due
to the fact that the former involves a deadweight cost of value diversion. Therefore, we have:
(γv,i, V v) = (γs,i, V
(γ)
s ) 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
For (moderate, low), firm i is either incentivized (γv,i = θ), else it misbehaves (0 < γv,i <
θ). In order to establish when it is incentivized we compare:
N1(γv,i = θ) ≡
(
θ kIiθ − Ii
)ηi
(
(1− θ)kIiθ − Ij
)−ηj
(
V0
kIi
θ
)β
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with:
N2(0 < γv,i < θ) ≡
(
((γs,i − θφ(1−γs,i)1−φ )(1− φ) + θφ) V
(γ)
s
1−φ+θφ − Ii
)ηi
(
(1− (γs,i − θφ(1−γs,i)1−φ ))(1− φ) V
(γ)
s
1−φ+θφ − Ij
)−ηj
 V0
V
(γ)
s
1−φ+θφ
β
N1(γv,i = θ) is equal to N2(0 < γv,i < θ) when:
φ∗ =
1
1− θ −
θ

1− θ
θ
kIi − Ij
1− θ
θ
kIi − Ij

β
ηj
(1− θ)θ (A.7)
such that N1(γv,i = θ) is larger when φ > φ∗. Consequently, we have:
(γv,i, V v) =

(
γs,i − θφ(1− γs,i)
1− φ ,
V
(γ)
s
1− φ+ θφ
)
θ < θ ≤ θ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ∗
(θ, kIi/θ) θ < θ ≤ θ, φ∗ < φ ≤ φ
For (moderate,moderate), firm i is either incentivized (γv,i = θ), else it misbehaves
(γv,i = 0). In order to establish when it is incentivized we compare N1(γv,i = θ) with:
N2(γv,i = 0) ≡
(
(0(1− φ) + θφ)kIiθφ − Ii
)ηi
(
(1− 0)(1− φ)kIiθφ − Ij
)−ηj
(
V0
kIi
θφ
)β
N1(γv,i = θ) is equal to N2(γv,i = 0) when:
θ∗ =
1− (1− φ)φ
β
ηj
−1
1 + (1− φ
β
ηj )
1− θ
θ
(A.8)
such that N1(γv,i = θ) is larger when θ < θ∗. Consequently, we have:
(γv,i, V v) =
{
(θ, kIi/θ) θ < θ ≤ θ∗, φ ≤ φ ≤ φ
(0, kIi/θφ) θ
∗ < θ ≤ θ, φ ≤ φ ≤ φ
For (moderate, high), firm j cannot let firm i misbehave, because it cannot expect to
break even if firm i misbehaves. Therefore, firm j incentivizes firm i and we have:
(γv,i, V v) = (θ, kIi/θ) θ ≤ θ ≤ θ, φ < φ ≤ 1
For (high, low) and (high,moderate), this time firm j cannot incentivize firm i because
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it cannot expect to break even if firm i behaves. Therefore, firm j lets firm i misbehave and
we have:
(γv,i, V v) =

(
γs,i − θφ(1− γs,i)
1− φ ,
V
(γ)
s
1− φ+ θφ
)
θ < θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ
(0, kIi/θφ) θ < θ ≤ 1, φ < φ ≤ φ
Finally, for (high, high), N1 and N2 are both negative, since firm j can break even neither
by incentivizing firm i nor by letting it misbehave. Consequently, the bargaining between the
firms fails in this region.
Proof of Proposition 7. We compare firm i’s expected NPV when it receives full
rights to the project NPV (C)s,i with its expected NPV when it is offered γv,i = θ by firm j due
to incentive compatibility NPV (θ)s,i :
NPV
(C)
s,i = (V
(C)
s − Cs,i − Ii)
(
V0
V
(C)
s
)β
≶ NPV (θ)s,i = (θ(kIi/θ)− Ii)
(
V0
(kIi/θ)
)β
(1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))1−β(k − 1)I
(
V0
kI
)β
≶ (k − 1)Ii
(
θV0
kIi
)β
(1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))1−β ≶ Ii
I
(
θI
Ii
)β
The right hand side of the inequality above is larger when ηi < η∗ ≡ β− (Ii(β− 1))/(Iθk), in
which case firm i prefers the sharing rule with no cash transfers.
We also compare NPV (C)s,i with firm i’s expected NPV when it is offered γv,i = 0 by firm
j due to limited liability NPV (0)s,i :
NPV
(C)
s,i = (V
(C)
s − Cs,i − Ii)
(
V0
V
(C)
s
)β
≶ NPV (0)s,i = (θφ(kIi/θφ)− Ii)
(
V0
(kIi/θφ)
)β
(1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))1−β(k − 1)I
(
V0
kI
)β
≶ (k − 1)Ii
(
θφV0
kIi
)β
(1 + (1− ηi)(k − 1))1−β ≶ Ii
I
(
θφI
Ii
)β
The right hand side of the inequality above is larger when ηi < η∗∗ ≡ β−(Ii(β−1))/(I(θφ)k),
in which firm i prefers the sharing rule with no cash transfers.
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Figure 1: Firm i’s payoff and investment threshold
In panel (a), firm i’s expected NPV with cash transfers, NPV (C)s,i (the solid line),
with equity stake transfers, NPV (γ)s,i (the dotted line), and with both cash and equity
stake transfers, NPV (γ,C)s,i (the dashed line), which coincides with the “exercise decision
first, sharing rule second” scenario, NPVe,i, are depicted. In panel (b), the solid and
dotted lines represent the optimal investment threshold with cash transfers, V (C)s , and
equity stake transfers, V (γ)s , respectively. The dashed line represents the first best-
investment threshold, V , which coincides with both the “exercise decision first, sharing
rule second” threshold V e as well as with the threshold in a scenario with both cash
and equity stake transfers, V (γ,C)s . The set of parameter values used in the plots is
{Ii, Ij, V0, β} = {25, 75, 100, 2}.
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Figure 2: The impact of the value diversion threat on the sharing rule
Parameter φ denotes the fraction of project value firm i can divert and θ is the fraction
of diverted value it can appropriate. Five regions correspond to qualitatively different
outcomes of bargaining in Proposition 6. The set of parameter values used in the plot
is {ηi, β} = {0.1, 2} and Ii = Ij.
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Figure 3: The The impact of value diversion threat on the value of firm i’s option to
invest
Parameter φ denotes the fraction of project value firm i can divert and θ is the fraction
of diverted value it can appropriate. Solid, dash-dotted, dotted, and dashed lines
correspond to the qualitatively different outcomes of bargaining in Proposition 6 where
(0 ≤ θ ≤ θ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1), (φ > φ∗, θ < θ ≤ θ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ), (θ < θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ φ), and
(θ < θ ≤ 1, φ < φ ≤ φ) respectively. The set of parameter values used in the plot is
{ηi, β} = {0.1, 2} and Ii = Ij.
Table 1: The project’s capital and ownership structures
The project’s capital and ownership structures are summarized under the scenarios EF and
JV and for different levels of γi and Ci. Under the EF scenario, firm i is an entrepreneurial
firm and firm j is an investor. Under the JV scenario, firms i and j, which may be in the
same industry, enter into a joint venture. γi (γj) is the fraction of the project owned by
firm i (j). Ci is a fixed payment made by firm i to firm j, such that Cj = −Ci.
EF scenario JV scenario
γi = 1 Ci > 0 pure debt firm i buys out firm j’s stake
γi < 1 Ci = 0 pure equity shared ownership without side payments
γi < 1 Ci 6= 0 debt-equity mix shared ownership with side payments
γi = 0 Ci < 0 cashing out firm i sells out its stake to firm j
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